During the 20th century, the role acquired by the philosophy of science has been both specific and important. Philosophers have often found scientific results and procedures to be a particularly stimulating subject; conversely, many scientists have found it necessary for their work to turn their attention to problems that, while pertinent to science, cannot be solved within the confines of its procedures. This latter circumstance has placed certain demands on the philosophy of science. These are separate and distinct from those of general philosophy. While continuing to be a branch of philosophical studies, the philosophy of science (as distinct from scientific studies) must have not only a general familiarity with the technical problems of the individual sciences as far as their evolution is concerned, but also a special familiarity. For his part, the scientist who approaches a problem from a philosophical point of view must become accustomed to a type of control of this thinking. It is no longer that of experimental verification or purely logical-formal correctness.
The convergence of the different methods, mindsets and skills of the philosopher and the scientist therefore requires special training that only a school of philosophy of science can offer. And this convergence is a necessary precondition for the progress of certain sciences in frontier areas. Undoubtedly, philosophy as such cannot solve any scientific problem, but it helps the scientist to gradually determine and identify the problems that arise. The solution to some of these problems may later be found within science, while others may not be open to a technical solution but will nevertheless serve for the recognition of the boundaries of acquired knowledge and thus for a better determination of the problems themselves. In light of the fact that the philosophy of science is often combined with logic for historical reasons, it is particularly important to distinguish the tasks of the philosophy of science from those of logic. It is particularly important to distinguish the tasks of the philosophy of science from those of logic in view of the fact that, for historical reasons, these two fields of research are often coupled, even at the organisational level. Logic has provided essential tools for the study of the foundations of mathematics, but in its current form the latter is a scientific discipline, to be precise mathematical, not philosophical. Nor does the problem of the foundations of mathematics exhaust the tasks of the philosophy of science, which can be applied to all fields of the exact and natural sciences.